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REFRAMING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS
TORTURE OR TERRORISM**
Abstract: This paper focuses on the analysis of the phenomenon of domestic
violence and the distinctive features for which is it may be recognized as a
specific form of torture and/or terrorism at home. The author provides an
overview of the scientific debate among feminist authors on this conception
which has given rise to an innovative approach to understanding the concept
of domestic violence. Underscoring the substantive similarity of domestic
violence with the acts of torture and/or terrorism, the author urges for state
action arguing that domestic violence as a form of gender-based violence
should be approached by applying the same logic and strategies which are
employed in response to traditional torture and terrorism.
Key words: domestic violence, torture, terrorism.

1. Introduction
Sometime in 1992, my dear, now deceased friend, women’s rights lawyer, and
law professor colleague, Rhonda Copelon, and I had an extended conversation
in which we agreed that, as we were committed to recognizing the sex/gender-specific aspects of domestic violence and its deep connection to women’s
worldwide inequality, we also were thinking about the merits and legal advantages of broadly reframing the rapidly developing women’s rights issue of intimate
partner/domestic violence to elicit its commonalities with other well-defined
forms of violence - more specifically, torture or terrorism. Rhonda argued for
the use of the category of ‘torture’ and its near relative of ‘cruel, inhuman and

* isabelmarcus@yahoo.com

** The topic of this article is based on the paper I.Markus “Reframing “Domestic Violence”:

Terrorism in Home” published in: M.Fineman, B.MyKitiuk (eds.), The Public Nature of Private
Violence: The Discovery of Domestic Abuse, Routledge, 1994. pp. 11-36.
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degrading’ treatment (Copelon, 1994). I found arguments for exploring the category of ‘terrorism’ (Marcus, 1994). The conversation was a thought-provoking
one; it ranged from the content of existing human rights norms to legal procedural considerations that might follow from such a reframing. We concluded by
agreeing that we needed to pursue the implications of our respective positions.

At the time, in some countries and in international human rights fora, feminist
activists and advocates had made some headway in developing the category of
gender-based violence—violence against women because they are women as an
unequivocal human rights violation. That violence included rape in all settings
from conflict zones to the marital bed, honor killing, and domestic/intimate
partner systemic violence (likely to occur in the home, a culturally identified
the ‘safe’ and ‘appropriate’ place for women). These activists noted that the
number of victims of gender-based violence exceeds those of war and of brutal
dictatorships. (Copelon, 1994: 292). In 1992, the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women published its General Recommendation No. 19,
on violence against women.1 In 1993, at the Second World Conference on Human
Rights held in Vienna, women’s advocacy groups succeeded in placing violence
against women on the agenda. The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action,
generated by the conference, stressed the importance of working towards the
elimination of violence against women in public and private life.2

As academics and activists, Rhonda and I in our respective teaching and NGO
work relied on feminist analyses of domestic violence which rest on premises
that “the vulnerability of women as a group to the violence is caused by a combination of (1) traditional news about male and female roles and hegemony which
may make it difficult for authorities to oppose violence in a relationship…; (2)
the private nature of systemic intimate violence…; (3) the concomitant escalation of extreme violence upon separation; (4) economic difficulties restraining
women’s freedom; and (5) the acquiescence of the victim’s community to the
violence.” (Meyersfeld, 2010: 124).
We independently had come to the conclusion that a reframing would enhance
feminist efforts to relocate the legal issue of domestic violence, which hitherto
had been identified as occurring in the private sphere of home and family—a
posture that protected perpetrators from state intervention and legitimate
the partial or total impunity they enjoyed (Copelon, 1994: 297). Since one of
the most important state justifications for inaction was the prevailing culture,
which persistently trivialized the violence as the chastisement or disciplining
1 74 UN Doc.HR/GEN/1 (1992).

2 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, Section II B, para 38, UNDOC.A/Conf 157/24,
12, July 1993.
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of women (Copelon, 1994: 296), we believed that such a reframing could help to
transcend these deeply-rooted cultural protections accorded to perpetrators
and assist in the world wide campaign for the transcultural and transnational
indictment of domestic violence. Reframing, we believed, could move beyond
prevailing many of the simplistically reductionist explanations for the violence
to an analysis of the political and cultural context of gender-based power and
control in order to generate state action (Marcus, 1994: 34).

In effect, our suggestions of connecting domestic violence to torture or terrorism were not deflections or diversions from the goal of expanding the women’s
rights canon, but rather directed at a fuller understanding of domestic violence
as a social and individual choice to do harm.3 We recognized that even though
both torture and terrorism are unique in their egregiousness, our purpose was
to educate about commonalities as well as sex specific aspects” (Copelon, 1994:
299). Our concern was whether privately inflicted gender violence would be
treated unequivocally as a human rights violation and as one giving rise to enforceable as opposed to precatory4 state responsibility. (Copelon, 1994: 294-295).
Like other feminist legal theorists, we understood that even as domestic violence
occurs worldwide in different settings and cultures, and is affected by race/
ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, disability, and immigrant or refugee status,
such violence has universal properties. First, that the violence is connected to
‘harmful’ masculinity (Anderson, 2008) - social and cultural patterns of conduct
and practice associated with gender. Second, that it violates women’s dignity, and
bodily and psychological integrity. Third, that it often involves intentional conduct. Fourth, that it is practiced with impunity because perpetrators are rarely
punished and, in so many cases, there are few, if any, remedies for the suffering
inflicted upon the woman survivor/victim. Fifth, that women abused by their
spouses/partners are likely to be silent about domestic violence - a testament
to the power of patriarchal5 culture associated with shaming, stereotyping
and stigmatizing those who publicly disclose the violence. Sixth, that women’s
relationships to society and the state are widely medicated through men and
3 Acts of systemic intimate violence include: punching; shouting; battering; biting; burning;
hacking; electrocution; starvation; mutilation; sleep deprivation; forced sexual touching;
forced sexual activities with third parties; poisoning; exposure; property destruction; murder,
withholding medical care; threats of harm; threats to remove children; threatening to use
a lethal weapon; persistent shouting; unrelenting accusations of infidelity; controlling day
to day activities; isolation; and threats of suicide. (Meyersfeld, 2010: 115).
4 Precatory is defined as requesting, recommending or expressing a desire for action but
usually in a non-binding way. Garner, B. (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 2009.

5 In ideology and practices, patriarchy, the world-wide dominant governing sex/gender
regime, addresses issues of control over the infliction of violence and, when warranted,
redress for violence deemed illegal or illegitimate in law or cultural practice.
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patriarchy constitutes men as a parallel state in many women’s lives (Copelon,
1994: 299). Seventh, that the worldwide incidence and frequency of domestic
violence are ‘dark numbers’.6 (Marcus, n.d.).

In 1994, Rhonda Copelon wrote a signature article “Recognizing the Egregious
in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture”. My essay “Reframing “Domestic
Violence”: Terrorism in the Home was published in the same year in a volume
discussing the public nature of private violence.
In 2014, twenty years after Rhonda and I had written our respective articles,
I decided to revisit them. Fully aware that in the interval between our conversation and the present, an enormous amount of scholarly and activist work at
domestic, regional and international levels has enriched our understanding of
domestic violence (or intimate partner violence) I asked myself several questions. What can be learned by revisiting these two articles, written in a different
period when domestic violence, though integrated into the women’s rights canon
as women’s right to be free from gender-based violence as well as other violence,
was still a contested subject in the broad international human rights canon? Were
our efforts ultimately mere symbolic gestures generated by the frustration of
hearing domestic violence normalized, naturalized, mocked, disregarded, dismissed, or ignored in popular discourse as well as in legal system proceedings?
2. Discussion of the Literature

2.1. Domestic Violence, Torture, and Terrorism
Strategically, Copelon’s reframing of domestic violence as torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment had the advantage of recognition under an international human rights legal umbrella — the making of the International
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment7 made torture “non-derogable”.8 In addition, torture has as an
extensive historical pedigree replete with admittedly chilling details of various
inventive practices in different societies. Although the drafters of the international UN Convention Against Torture and the Inter-American Torture Convention9
did not have gender-based violence in mind, they did expand the concept of state
involvement in torture beyond active complicity to include passive involvement
in privately inflicted torture including individual violence (Copelon, 1994: 297).
6 In the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, phenomena known to exist but unrecorded
or undocumented were called dark numbers.

7 The International Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
8 Not respectable or abrogatable by later law to limit the utility and force of a provision.

9 Inter-American Convention to Prevent & Punish Torture OAS/Serv. L/V/I.4rev (2000).
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Both forms of state involvement, Copelon argues, are “broad enough to embrace
the failure of government to redress domestic violence (Copelon, 1994: 355). In
her analysis, domestic violence as torture encompasses a broader range of cases
than servitude which is outlawed under international law. Conversely, domestic
violence of lesser severity clearly qualifies as cruel inhuman and degrading treatment which, in human rights law, encompasses less severe forms of (official)
violence (Copelon, 1994: 298). The distinction between torture and domestic
violence does not lie in the severity of the experience or the tendency to differentiate physical and mental brutality. It flows from the different degrees to which
society recognizes both physical and psychological brutality and suffering in the
two (private and public) contexts complicated by gender (Copelon, 1994: 324325). Her primary goals are to challenge the assumption that intimate partner
violence is a less severe and terrible form of violence than that perpetuated by
the state (Copelon, 1994: 352) and to trigger a range of state responsibilities.
She seeks to determine whether torture and domestic violence are “equivalently
heinous” (Copelon, 1994: 308).
She recognizes that understanding the battery and sexual abuse of women by
their intimate partners—perhaps the most common and dangerous form of
gender-based violence—as torture, thereby giving rise to obligatory international and national responsibilities, is a ‘hard case’ from the conventional human
rights lens. But, it is an obvious one from women’s experience (Copelon, 1994:
295). Consequently, she embarks on a well-developed comparative analysis
examining the methods, goals, context, and effects of torture and of domestic
violence. She is mindful of the caveat that just as torture is affected by differences in political, social, economic, and gendered contexts, so, too, in domestic
violence women are marked by differences (racial or ethnic, class, culture and
sexuality) (Copelon, 1994: 299).

Torture involves intentional infliction of pain against the will of the victim
(Copelon, 1994: 315). It, thereby, ascribes culpability to the aggressor (Copelon,
1994: 325) - either the state through its agents or non-state actors using torture
in conflict situations. In her review of international legal standards concerning
torture, she notes that individual malice is not necessary and loss of control is
not exculpatory (Copelon, 1994: 328). The use of torture is an abuse of power and
an offense against human dignity (Copelon, 1994: 320) regardless of whether the
contention is that its purpose is to elicit information (Copelon, 1994: 331-333),
to punish, (Copelon, 1994: 333-337), to intimidate (Copelon, 1994: 337-339), for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind (Copelon, 1994: 339-340), or to
obliterate the personality or diminish capacities (Copelon, 1994: 341). So, too, is
domestic violence an abuse of power for a profoundly similar variety of reasons.
In both instances, these purposes violate human rights norms. Therefore, she
17
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concludes, the application of Convention Against Torture to domestic violence
is appropriate and warranted.10

Fourteen years after Copelon published her article, the second thematic report11
of the Special Rapporteur on Torture to the UN Human Rights Council has authoritatively categorized domestic violence as a form of torture. It confirms that
the purpose element requirement is always fulfilled in gender-specific violence
against women which is inherently discriminatory12 and that the continuum of
harm is a process.

In “Reframing Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home,” my analysis develops
the commonalities between domestic violence and terrorism. Terrorism, like
torture, also is widely condemned in the international human rights canon.
But, it is not the subject of a treaty instrument.13 It encompasses collectively
oriented strategies and practices of coercive violence on targeted populations
to generate high levels of public anxiety. Copelon refers to family traditions of
punishing disobedience and disciplining by loss of liberty (both integral components of the rationale for domestic violence) as a culture of terror (Copelon, 1994:
293). In later domestic violence literature, domestic violence is characterized
as ‘terroristic control’ to underscore the scope of the control tactics used by the
perpetrators of the violence. (Johnson, 1995: 285-86).

I argue that terrorism relies on three fundamental tactics to terrorize individuals
(and populations) and, thereby, enhance perpetrators’ credibility: unannounced
and seemingly random, but, actually, calculated attacks of violence; psychological
as well as physical warfare aimed at silencing protests and minimizing retaliatory responses from the targets of violence; and the creation of an atmosphere
of intimidation in which there may be no truly safe place to which the targets
10 Copelon also considers arguments for domestic violence as an independent human rights
violation given its historic invisibility trivialization, particular character and effects (360)
and for law gender-based violence as jus cogens which embraces values of supreme, overriding
and fundamental importance to the international community thereby taking precedence
over treaties to the contrary, and being non-derogable (p. 365-367).
11 UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Manfred Novick: Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights,
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Including the right to Development (15
January 2008) UNDOC A/HRC/7/3.
12 Special Rapporteur on Torture, 2008 Report, para 68.

13 The U.N. has produced a number of General Assembly resolutions on terrorism Including
UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy UNGAOR 65th Session, Agenda Item 150, UN Document
A/Res/65/297 8 September 2010 and Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism UNGAOR
65th Session Agenda Item 107, UN Document A/Res/65/34 6 December 2010 ‘with particular
alacrity and consistency since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
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can escape - thereby making it difficult to judge when and whether targeted individuals are safe or at risk. Personal identity and human connection are deeply
compromised; they are replaced by a widespread sense of insecurity, passivity,
and defeatism (Marcus, 1994: 31-32).

That said, not all persons, who become targets of terrorism, respond in similar
ways or even in a consistent manner over time. Nor are conventional general
categories of class, race, or ethnicity accurate predictors of individual responses to the violence. Moreover, characterizing the targets of terrorism as either
only victims or only resisters risks overstructuring or overdefining them. Some
targets may respond with acts directed against the perpetrators of the violence;
other targets may consider their very survival as a challenge to the terrorism;
yet others may succumb to understandable feelings of defeat and denial (Marcus, 1994: 32).
I contend that there are striking parallels and similarities between terrorism as
a strategy used to destabilize a community or society consisting both of women
and men, and domestic violence abuse perpetrated against women. Violence
against women in intimate partnership relationships is designed to exercise and
maintain domination and control, to enhance or reinforce advantages, and to
defend or maintain privileges. As targets of domestic violence, many women live
in a world punctuated by violent, traumatic and/or catastrophic events, some of
which are predictable and others unpredictable—tailored by the perpetrator
to the domestic intimate context. These events include threats and humiliation,
stalking, surveillance, coercion, and physical or psychological violence. Whether
that violence is identified as the imposition of discipline, as a strategy of family
governance, or as an act of the assertion of masculinity, women can be kept in
their culturally and socially designated ‘place’ as well as threatened with or
actually lose their social attachments. For many victim/survivors the perpetrator often appears to be omnipotent and omniscient.

“Just as persons caught in situations of politically inspired terrorism display a
range of responses to the fear and tragedy it generates, so too, women whose
experience in intimate partnering situations is marked by violence demonstrate
a variety of behaviors and coping mechanisms for their situation.” (Marcus,
1994:33). That said, the reaction to such traumatic or catastrophic events experienced by many targeted women is more than fear for their immediate safety
or the safety of their children. The trauma of the violence governs, guides, or
influences their actions and decisions. In such situations, survival becomes a
form of resistance to domestic violence terrorism (Marcus, 1994: 32-33).
Unlike targets of politically inspired terrorism or torture, however, women, who
are targeted in domestic violent relationships, often do not elicit sympathy or
19
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respect for the oppression they face. All too often, there is a conceptual shift to
a focus on the nature and extent of their “provoking” the violence and abuse.
This shift is of crucial significance. It disconnects the violence from the social,
cultural, economic, and political context of sex-gender domination and subordination. Instead, abused women become the incarnation of prevailing gender
stereotypes, such as “nagging bitch,” a woman with a “bad attitude,” or a castrating female” (Marcus, 1994: 33).
3. Analysis

If one accepts the arguments in the previous section of this paper that domestic
violence appears to share similar properties with torture and/or terrorism, the
next step is to assess the utility of these broader human rights categorizations
for the major actors involved with the violence - victim/survivors, perpetrators,
and the state. Here similarities and differences among torture, terrorism, and
domestic violence are relevant and important.
Insofar as the victim/survivor is concerned, both torture and terrorism are useful categories in providing heightened public recognition not only to the levels
and extent of physical pain and suffering, but also to psychological suffering and
damage as well as other forms of coercion. Arguably, given the condemnation
of both torture and terrorism as reprehensible forms of violence, recognition
of their similarities and connections to domestic violence may assist in capturing public attention to domestic violence in its broader political context. Such
recognition may enable us to pay closer attention to victim’s voices and stories.

That said, for the victim/survivor there are differences between torture/terrorism and domestic violence. Though torture and terrorism can be imposed on
both sexes, in ‘traditional’ torture situations, men are much more likely to be the
targets and, thus, the preponderance of victim/survivors. In domestic violence
situations, however, an overwhelmingly disproportionate number of women
are the victim/survivors.14

In domestic violence situations, the perpetrator seeks to establish his dominance
not only by terrorizing the victim but also by shaming her and degrading her
in the eyes of others, so that she will be stigmatized and scorned should the
crime be disclosed. (Herman, 2005: 200-201). Whereas, victims need social
acknowledgement and support, in legal proceedings, should they seek redress,
they endure a public challenge to their credibility. (Herman, 2005, 202).
14 See Council of European Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against
Women and Domestic Violence, Istanbul, 11v. 2011 Art. 2.1 Scope of the Convention.
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In addition, unlike domestic violence situations, where gender-inflected provocation is often attributed to the victim/survivor as a culturally accepted
mitigating circumstance or explanation, torture and terrorism do not generate
such excuses (Copelon, 1994: 361).

Insofar as understanding the status and actions of perpetrators of domestic
violence is concerned, both torture and terrorism are useful categories. In both,
men are overwhelmingly the perpetrators of the violence. The perpetrators’
acts of violence reveal the deliberate intent to control and coerce the victim(s)
to conform in designated ways, to set an example, and to send a warning of the
risks individuals run by failing to meet perpetrators’ desires, requirements, and
demands. Likewise, the ample domestic violence literature discusses strategies
of control and coercion indicative of perpetrators’ intent. In addition, in traditional torture and terrorism, perpetrators are not deterred by existing laws
and legal systems. Given the contemporary extent and frequency of domestic
violence, the same logic may apply to domestic violence perpetrators in many
states, even those with laws on the books ostensibly punishing the violence.
(WHO, 2002).
Insofar as the role of the state in responding to domestic violence is concerned,
torture or terrorism can be useful categories as well. Until now, however, they are
not well integrated into political/legal discourse. Whereas torture and terrorism
are highly politicized categories encompassing perpetrators’ accountability for
their actions and consequences, until recent times, domestic violence has been
a depoliticized category enabling custom to prevail and avoiding purposive
gender-based dynamics of domination and subordination (Copelon, 1994: 32829). Unlike torture and terrorism, widely perceived as fundamental violations
of individual and communities, gender-based domestic violence still is widely
excused, thereby feeding men’s sense of entitlement, and the victim’s sense of
culpability. (Copelon, 1994: 362). There is, however, growing recognition of the
need for state action15 to protect victim/survivors and punish perpetrators
by criminalizing domestic violence, providing civil remedies such as orders of
protection and other safety measures, and acting with due diligence to effectively implement the law so that victim/survivors can begin to trust the state.
(Marcus, 1994: 32-34).
Torture or terrorism by state agents can be stopped; torture or terrorism by
non-state perpetrators can be eliminated through negotiations or more drastic
militarized state action. Neither of these strategies work for domestic violence
which is based on deeply rooted sex/gender inequalities.
15 In Opuz v. Turkey (app.no.33401/02 (ECHR9 June 2009), the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg recognized this that state obligations to protect victims of domestic
violence from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3.
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4. Summary

Both reframings of domestic violence, as torture or terrorism, jolt our consciousness and, hopefully, our conscience. They uncover the deep affinities of
domestic violence with categories of violence that are universally condemned
as human rights violations because they deny human dignity and integrity. They
shock us into recognition of the extent to which domestic violence cannot be
narrowly cabined or diminished or controlled by reliance on formal equality.
They help us understand that domestic violence is a form of substantive gendered inequality - a societal distribution, at both individual and structural levels,
of who does and is allowed to do what to whom. Domestic violence violates the
rights of women who, like men, are entitled to integrity, security and dignity. It
constitutes discrimination against women by maintaining both the individual
woman and women as a class in an inferior and subordinated position within
their respective societies.
Consideration of domestic violence under the rubric of torture or terrorism
is not designed to raise the threshold of what constitutes domestic violence.
Nor does it entail the disregard for diminution of its consequences. Nor does
it undermine recognition of survivor/victim’s agency and resistance. Rather it
provides greater space for the silenced voices of significant numbers of women
by acknowledging their painful, shocking, lived experiences (WHO, 2002) and
eliminating the normalization of their pain and trauma. It helps in the worldwide
campaign to change the nature of the specific behavior from acceptable to unlawful (Meyerfeld, 2010: 267).
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Др Изабел Маркус,
Професор Правног факултета
Државни универзитет државе Њујорк, Бафало, САД

Редефинисање концепта насиља у породици као
акта тортуре или тероризма у породици
Сажетак

Нови дискурс у схватању насиља у породици, које се одређује као акт
тортуре или тероризма у породици, преставља атак на нашу свест и има
за циљ да је пробуди. Ова нова одређења разоткривају дубоку подударност
насиља у породици са категоријама насиља које су предмет опште осуде,
јер представљају повреду људских права и негацију људског достојанства и
интегритета. На крајње алармантан начин она нас приморавају да схватимо
до које мере насиље у породици не сме бити уско или олако схваћено,
укалупљено или ограничено ослањањем на формалну једнакост полова.
Ова нова схватања нам помажу да препознамо да је насиље у породици
облик фактичке родне неједнакости која, како на индивидуалном тако
и на структуралном нивоу, представља образац социјалне дистрибуције
родних улога: шта је коме дозвољено или шта ко може да чини другоме.
Насиље у породици представља повреду права жена које, као и мушкарци,
имају право на поштовање личног интегритета, сигурности и достојанства.
Насиље у породици представља и дискриминацију жена, под којом се
подразумева инфериоран и подређен положај сваке жене понаособ и свих
жена, као социјалне категорије у одређеном друштву.
Успостављање новог оквира за редефинисање насиља у породици као
акта тортуре или тероризма у породици није усмерено ка подизању нивоа
онога што чини насиље у породици. Нови оквир нипошто не представља
обезвређивање последица насиља у породици, нити има за циљ да на било
који начин оспори социјално препознавање патње и отпора преживелог/
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жртве. Он првенствено обезбеђује више простора да се чују ућуткани
гласови великог броја жена које су биле изложене оваквим видовима
насиља у породици, али представља и прилику да друштво спозна болна
и застрашујућа искустава која су те жене преживеле (Светска здравствена
организација, 2002) и спречи “тривијализацију” њихове патње, као и даљу
трауматизацију. У светским размерама, нови оквир може да представља
почетак заједничке акције која би довела до промене одређених облика
понашања, који би од социјално прихватљивих постали неприхватљиви
и незаконити.
Кључне речи: насиље у породици, тортура, тероризам.
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